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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
As many routine administrative processes are increasingly susceptible to 
automation through the use of algorithms, a core aim of both the Polish gov-
ernment1 and the EU2 is to expand the share of public services delivered by 
digital means. The potential benefits are immense: automated administrative 
procedures can be used for developing new public services based on the auto-
matic processing of data collected by the authorities and generating innova-
tions that lead to more accessibility (e.g. allowing for 24/7 online access unre-
stricted by geographical and spatial barriers) and efficiency (time, paper and 
other resource-friendly measures). Overall, digital initiatives within the EU 
Single Market may contribute up to €415 billion per year to economic growth.3
Notwithstanding the undeniable benefits, automating administrative pro-
ceedings entails significant legal challenges, and automated administrative 
action is still under-researched. Although important studies have touched 
upon the legal aspects of delivering public services through digital means, 
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they have approached this issue mostly through focusing on technical issues 
such as electronic communications, information management or data safety.4 
However, existing models of delivering public services are being deeply trans-
formed by technological progress, which changes the relationship between the 
tasks performed by humans and those performed by algorithms. Given that 
the expansion of task performance by algorithms particularly encompasses 
reasoning and decision-making,5 it will be crucial to adjust the legal frame-
work for algorithmic (automated) administrative action. In principle, auto-
mating administrative proceedings will come down to the ability to produce 
decisions autonomously, namely by technological means without human in-
volvement. Obviously, however, algorithms can only be considered to ‘auto-
mate’ a specific procedure in the sense that they can run continuously and 
translate inputs (data) into outcomes, such as administrative decisions. Nev-
ertheless, they must have their parameters and uses specified by humans and 
be deployed in accordance with the applicable legal framework.6
In particular, automated administrative action might jeopardize impor-
tant due process rights guaranteed by the Code of Administrative Procedure.7 
Individuals risk being degraded to mere objects of administrative action, as 
they face a so-called ‘black-box problem’ (i.e. are unable to assess either the 
specific rules applicable to their case or the potential outcomes of their ap-
plication). What is more, the automation of administrative procedures might 
transfer important duties of conducting the proceedings onto individuals (e.g. 
providing and assessing the pertinence and credibility of information), while 
at the same reducing the procedural duty of care obligations of administra-
tive authorities. Finally, the disclosure the actual operations of applied algo-
rithms, used data, and their assessment may become challenging for author-
ities, unintelligible for individuals, and problematic to review. Automating 
administrative action in a way that makes use of emergent technologies and 
simultaneously safeguards individual rights can thus only be achieved if the 
established procedural frameworks are adjusted to the digital environment.
Existing cases of automated administrative action in Poland are essen-
tially regulated on a casuistic basis. For instance, the decisions of the Polish 
Social Insurance Institution regarding the valorization of benefits are gener-
ated automatically by an algorithmic system, and constitute official confirma-
tions of the calculations made.8 Another recent and practical example is the 
awarding of economic impact funds to entrepreneurs who experienced turno-
ver decreases as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.9 A systematic regulatory 
4 Sibiga (2019).
5 World Economic Forum (2018). The Future of Jobs Report. Cologny/Geneva: viii and 3.
6 Coglianese, Lehr (2017): 1177.
7 Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland [JL] 2020, item 256 („CAP”).
8 Draft Act amending the Act on Pensions from the Social Insurance Fund, No. 935 / VII 
Term of office, Explanatory memorandum (2012): 2.
9 See, e.g. Article 15zzc sec. 1 and Article 15zze3 sec. 3 of the Act on Special Solutions Related 
to the Prevention, Counteraction and Combating of COVID- 19, other Infectious Diseases and 
Crisis Situations Caused by Them (JL 2020, item 1842).
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approach to automated administrative decision-making is, however, yet to be 
elaborated. In this regard, an analysis of the GDPR’s10 regulatory framework 
concerning automated decision-making (ADM) may prove fruitful, given that 
the GDPR contains a number of provisions that may turn out to be applicable 
in automated administrative proceedings that directly affect the procedural 
rights of parties in proceedings before national authorities. In the context of 
these considerations, it has to be determined to what extent and in which way 
the GDPR will influence Polish administrative procedures and whether the 
GDPR-approach to ADM can be generalized to provide a broader framework 
for delivering public services by administrative authorities.
The analysis will briefly outline the framework that the GDPR provides 
for cases of administrative ADM (section II) in order to then proceed to exam-
ine the influence of that framework on selected elements of administrative 
due process as guaranteed by the CAP (sections III–VI). Section VII will pres-
ent the conclusions.
II. THE ROLE OF THE GDPR IN SHAPING AUTOMATED 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
The GDPR provides a general framework for ADM concerning individ-
uals that is organized around the principles of fairness and transparency. 
Putting these principles into action is particularly desirable in a public-re-
lated context, in order to avoid the unfounded concealment of governmental 
action and ensure the democratic accountability of executive power.11 Given 
that the GDPR directly applies to the exercise of official authority vested in 
data controllers12 it is necessary, in the first step, to determine the extent 
to which the GDPR shapes the legal framework of ADM by the administra-
tions of the Member States. Importantly, however, ADM in the meaning of the 
GDPR does not entail all forms of automated decisions. According to Article 
22 GDPR, individuals (so called data subjects) have the right not to be subject 
to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, but 
only with regard to decisions which produce legal effects concerning them or 
affecting them to a similarly significant degree.13 The two conditions for the 
applicability of Article 22 GDPR (the sole basis of automated processing and 
legal or similarly significant effects) must be met jointly.14 
10 Regulation on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 119, 4 May 
2016 (GDPR).
11 Coglianese, Lehr (2017): 1213.
12 Article 6(1) e GDPR.
13 Article 22(1) GDPR.
14 Mednis (2019): 176.
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The right to not be subject to an automated decision within the meaning 
of Article 22 GDPR is nevertheless limited and does not apply in three cases, 
namely if such a decision:
a. is necessary for entering into, or performance of, a contract between the 
data subject and a data controller;
b. is authorized by EU or Member State law to which the controller is 
subject and which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data 
subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests; or
c. is based on the data subject’s explicit consent. 15
If a particular case of ADM is covered by one of these exceptions, Article 
13(2) f, Article 14(2) g and Article 15(1) h GDPR respectively oblige data con-
trollers to inform data subjects about the fact that a decision concerning them 
may be or has been issued by the application of automated means, especially 
if those means included profiling. Moreover, data subjects must receive mean-
ingful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and 
the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subjects. What is 
more, in the cases of exception a and c mentioned above, the GDPR obliges 
data controllers to implement suitable measures to safeguard the data sub-
ject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, which should include at 
least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to 
express the data subject’s point of view and to contest the decision.16 In the 
case of exception b, however, Member States (or the EU) are competent to 
make use of ADM which produces legal or similarly significant effects, on the 
condition that they simultaneously provide suitable measures to safeguard 
data subjects’ rights and freedoms and legitimate interests.17
Therefore, while the GDPR defines a minimum standard of safeguards 
for ADM, based on two of those exceptions (a and c), it does not define such 
a minimum for the third one (b) it follows, then, that Member States are at 
liberty to authorize ADM in any context – also the rendering of administrative 
decisions – provided that the automation of the particular procedure is man-
dated by law, and that associated safeguards are considered ‘suitable’ under 
the GDPR. The conditions of ‘suitability’ are, however, not specified. Never-
theless, it must be taken into account that the GDPR aims to ‘provide natural 
persons in all Member States with the same level of legally enforceable rights 
and obligations and responsibilities for controllers and processors’,18 including 
through ‘setting out in detail the rights of data subjects and the obligations of 
those who process and determine the processing of personal data’.19 Consid-
ering these objectives, it may be argued that the suitability of the safeguards 
adopted for specific cases of ADM should be tested against the safeguards set 
out for the exceptions of Article 22(2) a and c GDPR and affirmed if found to 
be at least equivalent. 
15 Article 22(2) GDPR.
16 Article 22(3) GDPR.
17 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
18 Recital 13 GDPR.
19 Recital 11 GDPR.
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Apart from the obligation to provide data subjects with meaningful infor-
mation concerning ADM, Article 22(3) GDPR postulates a minimum level of 
safeguards.20 The regulatory framework for decisions based solely on automat-
ed processing (which produces legal effects for or similarly significantly affects 
the data subject) must include (1) the right of data subjects to be informed 
about the application of ADM and its logic, significance and consequences, as 
well as (2) the right to express one’s point of view, (3) the right to human in-
tervention, and (4) the right to contest the decision.21 The next sections will ex-
amine how these obligations relate to traditional due process elements guar-
anteed by the CAP, such as the duty to give reasons, the duty of care principle, 
participation rights, and the right to a remedy, and whether they coincide or 
at least serve a comparable function.
III. THE RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
According to the scholarly literature, a conjunction of Article 13–15 and 
22 GDPR allows to infer the right of data subjects to be informed about the 
application of ADM and its logic, significance and consequences (‘right to be 
informed’).22 The particular content of that right, however, remains controver-
sial. The debate in this regard comes down to two central issues: (1) wheth-
er the right to be informed entitles data subjects to an ex post justification 
of automated decisions or only to ex ante general information that presents 
the modus operandi of the applied algorithm; and (2) whether it obliges data 
controllers to give reasons for each particular automated decision or only to 
present the general functionalities of the applied algorithm.
One widely cited paper argues that the right to be informed should only 
entail an ex ante explanation of the general functionalities of the mechanism 
behind the ADM, as opposed to a right to explanation of particular automated 
decisions,23 and this approach used to be confirmed by the Article 29 Data Pro-
tection Working Party (A29WP). According to its 2017 guidelines, the right to 
be informed provided a ‘more general form of oversight’, rather than ‘a right 
to an explanation of a particular decision’.24 The revised 2018 guidelines, 
however, state that ‘In addition to general information about the processing, 
[…], the controller has a duty to make available the data used as input […].25 
Moreover, an alternative approach has proposed that the right to receive in-
20 Martini, Nink (2017): 3.
21 Malgieri (2019): 3.
22 Kaminski (2019); Malgieri, Comandé (2017); Selbst, Powles (2017); Edwards, Veale (2017).
23 Wachter, Mittelstadt, Floridi (2017): 78.
24 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2017). Guidelines on Automated individual 
decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 17/EN WP 251: 24. 
25 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2018). Guidelines on Automated individual 
decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 17/EN WP 251rev.01: 17 
(emphasis added).
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formation on the logic, significance and consequences of ADM should be inter-
preted in the context of its purpose to safeguard the rights of data subjects.26 
According to this model, the explanation concerning the logic involved should 
be clear and meaningful to a non-expert. Meeting this threshold should be 
assessed through a functional analysis in relation to actually enabling data 
subjects to exercise their rights guaranteed by the GDPR (e.g. the right to 
contest the automated decision). In the above-mentioned example of award-
ing economic impact funds to entrepreneurs, the right to be informed might 
oblige the administration to provide information on the particular data pro-
cessed and their sources (in other words, the financial situation based on tax 
returns), the parameters of the applied algorithm and the operations carried 
out by it.
Both threads of the above considerations can be said to be reflected in two 
elements of administrative due process included in the Polish CAP. First, its 
Article 9 establishes the so called ‘duty to provide information’ by obliging 
administrative authorities to fully inform the parties about factual and legal 
aspects which may influence their rights and duties being the object of the 
given proceedings. What is more, authorities must ensure that the parties 
(and other persons participating in the proceedings) do not suffer damage due 
to ignorance of the law, and for this purpose provide them with the necessary 
explanations and instructions. 
The duty to provide information is considered a safeguard aimed at pro-
tecting individuals against state power during administrative proceedings.27 
It translates into several procedural obligations on the part of the author-
ities, as it applies at every stage of proceedings, and not just at their last 
stage directly preceding the issuing of a decision.28 Primarily it comes down to 
ensuring that parties are fully aware of the factual and legal circumstances 
pertinent to their case which may influence their legal position. Fulfilling this 
requirement will only be effective if the communication by the authorities is 
meaningful (i.e. understood by the party).29 For instance, should an authority 
come to the conclusion that satisfying a party’s application requires additional 
documents application, it should inform the party of such necessity in order to 
ensure the full protection of his or her rights.30 The authority is also obliged 
to inform the party about the possibility of proving a given circumstance by 
means of specific evidence.31
However, the duty to provide information does not oblige the administra-
tive authorities to provide legal advice or instruct parties to choose the opti-
mal course of action. The duty of the authorities is to be interpreted broadly, 
26 Selbst, Powles (2017): 238.
27 Judgment of the Voivodship Administrative Court [‘VAC’] in Rzeszów, 12 March 2019, 
II SA/Rz 76/19; all judgments available at the Central Database of Administrative Court Decisions 
at <www.orzeczenia.nsa.gov.pl>.
28 Judgment of the VAC in Cracow, 11 April 2018, III SA/Kr 107/18.
29 Judgment of the VAC in Warsaw, 11 January 2018, VII SA/Wa 559/17.
30 Judgment of the VAC in Wrocław, 21 March 2017, IV SA/Wr 404/16.
31 Wojciechowska (2020).
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yet limited to providing the party with the necessary information on the basis 
of which he or she will be able to make an informed choice and decide on its 
actions.32
Second, administrative authorities are obliged to explain to the parties 
the specific reasons for deciding a specific case.33 An administrative decision 
should include, among other things, a statement of facts and the associated 
legal reasoning behind the decision.34 The statement of facts should in particu-
lar present the facts which the authority considered to be proven, evidence on 
which the authority relied, and reasons why the authority refused to consider 
other evidence as credible and refused to rely thereon. The legal reasoning, 
in turn, should in particular include an explanation of the legal basis of the 
decision and indicate the applied provisions of law35 and their interpretation. 
The authority should respond to all the arguments raised by the party during 
the proceedings, and this should be reflected in the reasoning of the decision.36 
Most importantly, when considering the arguments submitted by the party, 
the authority should do this in reference to the applicable law and in its rea-
sons indicate the interpretations of the relevant provisions in order to clarify 
why a decision was made, and also why a different decision was not made.37
The debates concerning the right to be informed established in the GDPR 
seem inadequate from the perspective of the Polish CAP as it provides both an 
ex ante duty to inform parties about legal and factual circumstances that may 
have implications for their case – before rendering a decision – and an ex post 
duty to give reasons for each particular decision after it has been issued. If 
a restrictive approach to the GDPR safeguards for automated decisions were 
to prevail, the Polish CAP would offer a higher degree of protection. Whether 
such a situation would remain within the ambit of Article 22(3) b GDPR is yet 
to be determined.
IV. THE RIGHT TO EXPRESS ONE’S POINT OF VIEW
Another safeguard guaranteed by the GDPR is the right to express one’s 
point of view. This right did not receive much attention in the scholarly liter-
ature and the GDPR does not elaborate on its scope. However, some scholars 
argue that it constitutes a participation mechanism with similar functions to 
the right to be heard38 or even its equivalent.39 
32 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court [SAC], 11 February 2019, II GSK 1989/18.
33 Article 11 CAP.
34 Article 107 § 1 pt 6 CAP.
35 Article 107 § 3 CAP.
36 Judgment of the SAC, 13 February 2019, II OSK 681/17; Judgment of the SAC, 7 June 
2016, II GSK 143/15.
37 Judgment of the VAC in Warsaw, 29 January 2019, II SA/Wa 1214/18.
38 Yeung (2019): 26.
39 Kaminski (2019): 198.
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In the context of administrative proceedings, the right to be heard has 
been attributed to two rationales.40 On the one hand, the right to be heard 
allows the parties to actively participate, act independently and make their 
own choices, and therefore to respect their dignity and self-determination. On 
the other, enabling parties to participate in administrative proceedings in-
creases the likelihood that a correct outcome will be reached on the merits of 
the case. Both rationales may be applied to administrative ADM. Considering 
that ADM comes down to the ability to issue decisions autonomously (i.e. via 
the application of algorithms and without human involvement) it produces the 
risk of forcing individuals into roles of passive objects of administrative action. 
To avoid such risks the GDPR clearly enables data subjects to participate in 
the decision-making process by exercising the right to express their point of 
view. What is more, given that ADM is necessarily based on the processing of 
data, for example observed about or inferred from the profiles of data subjects 
that have already been created,41 the probability of legitimate outcomes is 
increased as controllers may acquire missing data directly provided by data 
subjects.42
According to the Polish CAP, authorities must ensure the active participa-
tion of the parties at every stage of the proceedings. What is more, the parties 
are entitled to present their position concerning collected evidence and mate-
rials prior to the issuing of the decision.43 This obligation is considered to con-
stitute a guarantee of the parties’ right to be heard. Within the context of Pol-
ish administrative procedures, it encompasses the parties’ right to undertake 
procedural actions affecting the determination of the facts of a case and their 
legal implications,44 in particular the right to actively participate in investiga-
tory proceedings and the gathering and evaluating of evidence. For instance, 
if an expert witness is heard, the authority conducting the proceedings must 
notify the parties about the place and time of the hearing and enable them to 
ask the witness questions and provide explanations. A fact may be considered 
proven if the party had the opportunity to comment on it, irrespective of the 
content and weight of the particular piece of evidence.45
The main purpose of the right to actively participate in the proceedings 
and to present the party’s position on collected evidence is to allow the party 
to learn what facts and evidence, the authority will actually take into account 
when issuing the decision. This produces an opportunity to seek further clar-
ification of the facts of the case or to anticipate its outcome.46 Only the knowl-
edge of all the circumstances that will be taken into account by the authority 
40 Craig (2006): 360361.
41 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2018). Guidelines on Automated individual 
decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 17/EN WP 251rev.01: 8.
42 Yeung (2019): 26 and 30.
43 Article 10 § 1 CAP.
44 Judgment of the SAC, 14 June 2016, II OSK 2473/14.
45 Judgment of the SAC, 26 September 2012, I OSK 1425/12.
46 Borkowski, Krawczyk (2020): 184–185.
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when issuing the decision is considered to provide parties with a proper guar-
antee of defending their rights.47
Taking into account that the GDPR does not specify the contents of the 
right to express one’s point of view, it is susceptible to varying interpreta-
tions. To what extent the conception of the right to be heard elaborated in the 
Polish case law and doctrine is consistent with the GDPR, whether it should 
be exercised in a specific form (e.g. oral hearing or via digital interface), and 
whether it will encompass a right to discovery of data used as input by the 
administration are only the first examples of issues that will need to be ad-
dressed through ongoing dialogues between legislators, courts, and adminis-
trative authorities. A rigid standardization of hearings may undermine their 
goals, but in the discussed example of awarding economic impact funds to 
entrepreneurs the automation of a hearing might constitute a sufficient form 
given standardizable case constellations. However, when deciding whether to 
approve the full automation of other administrative procedures, the legislator 
should first consider whether the motives in favour of guaranteeing a (classic) 
hearing are not more important than those for a full automation and whether 
the latter should thus be rejected.
V. THE RIGHT TO HUMAN INTERVENTION
Based on Article 22(3) GDPR, in the case of ADM data subjects are, among 
other things, provided with the right to obtain human intervention on the part 
of the controller. When compared to the right to express one’s point of view, 
the specific scope of the right to obtain human intervention is yet unclear.48 
However, a consensus in this regard seems to be gradually emerging in the 
scholarly debate. 
According to the literature, its main function is to grant data subjects the 
possibility to request a new decision which takes into account their perspec-
tive (if they have not exercised their right to express their point of view) and/
or previously overlooked evidence.49 The effective exercise of this right in turn 
is contingent upon two elements: the intervening person must be (1) legally 
relevant in the process, and (2) must dispose of an expert understanding of 
the logic and operation of the involved algorithm. The first requirement will 
be fulfilled if the intervention is carried out by someone bestowed with the 
authority to change the decision on the basis of a reconsideration of all the 
relevant data50 including relevant additional information provided by the data 
subject if the omission of information by the algorithm was unfounded.51 The 
47 Judgment of the VAC in Wrocław, 28 July 2016, IV SA/Wr 60/16.
48 Mednis (2019): 183.
49 Malgieri (2019): 22.
50 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2018). Guidelines on Automated individual 
decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 17/EN WP 251rev.01: 21.
51 Gil González, De Hert (2019): 614.
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exercise of this authority will nevertheless be relevant only on the condition 
that it is able to assess the selection and structure of the input data, assess 
the operation of the applied algorithm, and explain to the data subject how the 
input data led to the final decision.52 This perspective can be seen confirmed 
by the A29WP, which indicated that to qualify as human involvement any 
oversight of automated decisions must be performed by someone who has the 
authority and competence to change the decision, while the entirety of the 
relevant data should be taken into account as part of the re-examination of 
the case.53
Given the above, determining the relationship between the right to human 
intervention and the principles established by the Polish CAP is challenging, 
as the CAP does not include concepts that could as a whole be considered to 
form a functional equivalent. However, considering that the main purpose of 
the right to human intervention is to bring about a second-step decision based 
on, among other things, correcting biases and considering all the relevant 
data by a human agent,54 it may be concluded that this right at least partly 
overlaps with the ‘objective truth principle’ established by the CAP. According 
to this principle, administrative authorities are obliged to undertake, ex officio 
or upon application, any actions necessary to accurately clarify the facts of 
a case during administrative proceedings.55 To achieve this objective, admin-
istrative authorities are also obliged to exhaustively collect and evaluate all 
the evidence pertinent to a given case.56 The duty to collect all the evidence 
concerning a particular case actually entails the gathering of all the facts that 
are relevant to the case at hand. Those facts are determined by the adminis-
trative authority based on the provisions of substantive law applicable to the 
given case.57
Administrative authorities cannot exclude any gathered evidence, but 
may refuse particular pieces if they doubt their credibility, provided that such 
doubts are substantiated.58 They are responsible for undertaking all the proce-
dural steps necessary for gathering evidence and comprehensively examining 
it so as to develop a comprehensive overview of the facts of the case in order to 
apply the law correctly. A failure to incorporate a relevant fact into the deci-
sion-making process constitutes a procedural error.59
Beyond any doubt both the objective truth principle and the right to hu-
man intervention serve the same purpose of adequately establishing and 
taking into account the totality of the relevant facts of a case. However, 
while the right to human intervention can be – but does not necessarily need 
52 Gil González, De Hert (2019): 614; Malgieri (2019): 25.
53 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2018). Guidelines on Automated individual 
decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 17/EN WP 251rev.01: 21.
54 Malgieri (2019): 22.
55 Article 7 CAP.
56 Article 77 § 1 CAP (emphasis added). 
57 Adamiak (2019).
58 Judgment of the SAC, 24 January 2017, II OSK 1052/15.
59 Judgment of the SAC, 23 October 2019, II OSK 2991/17.
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to be – invoked by the party (data subject), the duty of care principle applies 
to all administrative action as a general principle of Polish administrative 
law. Then again, the circumstance that the GDPR provides both a right to 
human intervention and a right to contest automated decisions suggests 
that data subjects are entitled to exercise the right to human intervention, 
for example endeavouring a re-evaluation of the employed input data, dur-
ing ongoing proceedings, before a decision is officially issued. In contrast, 
the CAP only guarantees the right to an administrative appeal, which may 
be invoked against a decision that has actually been issued. The Polish leg-
islator may therefore feel compelled to introduce a new form of oversight 
specifically dedicated to ADM.
VI. THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE DECISION
Article 22(3) GDPR obliges data controllers to safeguard data subjects’ 
rights, freedoms and legitimate interests in the context of ADM, by imple-
menting, among other things, the right to contest such decisions. Although 
some authors suggested that the broad language of the GDPR does not allow 
the specific contents of this right to be determined,60 others decisively argue 
that its substance comes down to forcing a controller to make a new decision.61 
In this regard, the right to contest a decision should not be understood as 
a right to question a particular result but rather as a right to have the entire 
decision-making process reviewed.62 In this context Mario Martini submitted 
that the right to contest a decision guaranteed in the GDPR should not only be 
understood as the traditional hierarchical administrative or judicial review, 
but also include the obligation on the part of the data controller to re-evaluate 
the input data, their processing and the outcome.63 Consequently, it should 
not be subject to unreasonably high (formal or substantive) requirements that 
might produce deterrent effects.64
Moreover, much attention was paid to the relationship of the right to con-
test an automated decision to the overall GDPR-framework designed to safe-
guard data subjects’ rights, in particular the right to be informed. Several 
authors argue that enabling data subjects to exercise their right to contest 
a decision is directly dependent on the information or explanation concern-
ing the decision provided by the data controller.65 This information, however, 
should not be limited to a mere disclosure of the source code behind the ap-
plied algorithm, as it presumably will turn out to be too complex for most in-
60 Politou, Alepis, Patsakis (2019): 322.
61 Wachter, Mittelstadt, Floridi (2017): 91.
62 Mednis (2019): 183.
63 Martini, Nink (2017): 4.
64 Martini, Nink (2017): 4.
65 Selbst, Powles (2017): 236; Gil González, De Hert (2019): 614.
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dividuals to be able to exercise their right to contest the automated decision.66 
Thus, as mentioned above, the information should be processed to a degree 
that is meaningful to a non-expert.
Interestingly, the right to an administrative appeal guaranteed by the 
CAP67 seems to address the above considerations quite adequately. At the out-
set it should be stressed that while the parties of administrative proceedings 
are entitled to an administrative appeal, this right may be exercised against 
a decision that completes a case by ruling on its merits or terminates the pro-
ceedings in a different way (e.g. by discontinuing them).68 The appeal may be 
lodged both against negative decisions (i.e. not satisfying the request of the 
party) and positive decisions.69 In particular, to lodge an appeal effectively it 
is sufficient for the party to indicate dissatisfaction with the decision.70 The 
scope of review by the second instance authority is not determined by the ar-
guments the party may have raised in the appeal and the authority carrying 
out the review will be required not only to re-evaluate the result of the case 
but to reconsider the entire decision-making process.71
What is more, if the administrative authority deciding the case in the first 
instance comes to the conclusion that the demands of the appeal should be 
allowed, before handing the appeal over to the reviewing authority, it may 
issue a new decision in which it can reverse its initial decision.72 Lodging an 
appeal may therefore move the case to a higher level authority, but only if the 
decision appealed against is not reversed in the course of re-evaluation by the 
first-instance authority in the first place.
Finally, the role that has been attributed to the right to be informed in 
the context of the right to contest an automated decision suggests that, when 
exercising the right to contest a decision, the GDPR compels data subjects to 
justify this by submitting specific grounds. On the other hand, in the Polish 
model of administrative procedure the formal requirements of an appeal are 
kept as low as possible. The purpose of the appeal proceedings is to allow for 
a review of the case in accordance with the intention and interests of the party 
without unnecessary formal requirements.73 Therefore, parties are not obliged 
to justify their appeal or present specific demands, and an indication of dis-
satisfaction with the decision appealed against suffices. Deterrent effects are 
thus unlikely. Overall the right to an administrative appeal as guaranteed by 
the CAP seems to not only meet the GDPR-standard, but also offers a higher 
degree of individual rights protection through a more detailed approach. Its 
particular relationship to the overall scope of the safeguards required by the 
GDPR is, however, yet to be determined.
66 Edwards, Veale (2017): 67.
67 Article 127 § 1 CAP.
68 Glibowski (2020).
69 Judgment of the VAC in Bydgoszcz, 12 December 2017, I SA/Bd 840/17.
70 Article 128 CAP.
71 Judgment of the SAC, 2 December 2011, II OSK 1774/10.
72 Article 132 CAP.
73 Judgment of the SAC, 24 February 2016, II OSK 1569/14.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
The GDPR is principally conceptualized as a directly applicable legal in-
strument aimed at setting out in detail the rights of data subjects and the ob-
ligations of data controllers74 irrespective of the circumstance of whether this 
applies to a private or public context.75 Given this purpose, not much space 
is left to national legislators in order to interpretatively align administrative 
procedures with its terms.76 Then again, the GDPR largely leaves open what 
the minimum guarantees for automated administrative procedures specifical-
ly consist of, yet indicates their necessary content and direction by postulating 
a minimum level of safeguards.77 The particularities of this minimum level 
are, however, still subject to an intense academic debate.
On the one hand the GDPR will modify certain elements of the Polish 
administrative procedure either by direct application, or sector-specific reg-
ulations and amendments of the CAP introduced by the national legislator. 
For instance, the GDPR guarantees a right to human intervention which may 
include the possibility of re-evaluating gathered evidence before an adminis-
trative decision is actually issued, and thus influencing an outcome without 
technically constituting an administrative appeal. Such a right is foreign to 
the CAP and as of the writing of this article it is unknown whether it will 
ever be introduced as part of a systematic approach to regulating automated 
administrative decision-making. Nonetheless, its inclusion in a sector-specific 
regulation seems conceivable. On the other hand, the broad language of Ar-
ticle 22(3) GDPR leaves room to elaborate its specifics based on the practices 
hitherto elaborated by the Polish authorities and courts. Although this may be 
undesirable from the perspective of striving for an EU-standard of protection, 
it can be concluded that mutual influences between the national and EU legal 
orders will occur.78
As new technologies emerge and calls for stronger regulatory measures to 
ensure adequate oversight over the development, deployment and use of algo-
rithmic tools intensify,79 the Polish legislator will be encouraged to introduce, 
over time, a general regulatory framework for automated administrative deci-
sion-making. The debate concerning the safeguards included in the GDPR and 
their relationship to the particular elements of administrative due process 
elaborated in the Polish tradition of administrative law will certainly be an 
important point of reference for possible responses to this challenge.
74 Recital 11 GDPR.
75 See, e.g. recital 43 GDPR.
76 Council of State of the Netherlands, Ad-hoc advice on the effects of digitization on consti-
tutional relationships [Ongevraagd advies over de effecten van de digitalisering voor de rechts- 
statelijke verhoudingen], Parliamentary documents II 2017/18, 26643, no. 557 [Kamerstukken II 
2017/18, 26643, nr. 557]: 11.
77 Martini, Nink (2017): 3.
78 Kaminski (2019): 195.
79 Declaration Decl(13/02/2019)1 by the Committee of Ministers on the manipulative capa-
bilities of algorithmic processes.
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DIGITIZING THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND SAFEGUARDING INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS: AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING AT THE INTERSECTION OF THE GDPR  
AND POLISH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
S u m m a r y
Automating administrative decision-making through the use of algorithms integrated into 
administrative procedures constitutes a major goal of both the Polish government and the EU. 
Notwithstanding the undeniable benefits of automated administrative decision-making, the 
tentative development of the law regulating administrative procedures in this regard trans-
lates into risks to important elements of administrative due process. Although a systematic 
regulatory approach to automated administrative decision-making is lacking, an analysis of the 
provisions of the GDPR concerning profiling algorithms and automated decision-making may 
prove rewarding, given that they may directly affect the procedural rights of parties in pro-
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ceedings before national authorities. On the other hand, the imprecise language of the GDPR 
makes it susceptible to interpretations deeply embedded in the hitherto elaborated practices of 
the Polish administrative procedure. The article analyses the intersection between the GDPR 
and Polish administrative procedure in order to examine the potential for mutual influences 
between both frameworks.
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